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INTRODUCTION

Deed construction has been a perennial task for courts virtually
since the Statute of Uses accorded legal approval to written transfers of
land in 1536.1 As guidance, courts eventually established the determination of the intent of the parties as their primary goal.2 Yet, the English
and American courts also embraced a number of other rules, many of
which admittedly worked to disregard the actual intent of the parties.'
One example is the rule that the language in the granting clause prevails
when it conflicts with other provisions.4
In Texas, this rule was given preeminent status in deed construction
in Alford v. Krum.5 In Alford, a multiclause deed 6 was construed as passing the interest expressed in the granting clause when there were irreconcilable conflicts with other clauses in the document. 7 Recently, much to
1. 7 W. S. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 387-88 (1926). Before the
Statute of Uses was passed, the law courts required a ceremony before corporeal interests in
land would pass to the grantee. The ceremony was known as feeoffment with livery of seisin.
THOMAS BERGIN & PAUL HASKELL, PREFACE TO ESTATES IN LAND AND FUTURE INTERESTS 11 (2d ed. 1984). See generally John C. Payne, The English Theory of Conveyancing Prior
to the Land Registration Acts, 7 ALA. L. REV. 227, 238-43 (1955).
The passage of other statutes worked in conjunction with the Statute of Uses which insured that deeds would wholly supplant the ceremony as a means of conveying land. Statute
of Enrollments, 1536, 27 Hen. 8, ch. 16 (Eng.); Statute of Frauds, 1676, 29 Car. 2, ch. 3 (Eng.).
See generally ROGER A. CUNNINGHAM, ET AL., THE LAW OF PROPERTY § 11.1, at 712
(1984).
2. See HOLDSWORTH, supra note 1, at 394. See also discussion infra part II.
3. See HOLDSWORTH, supra note 1, at 393-94. The Rule in Shelley's Case is perhaps the
most notorious example. See infra note 17.
4. See HOLDSWORTH, supra note 1, at 389-90; see, e.g., Hornet's Nest Girl Scout Council Inc. v. Cannon Found., Inc., 339 S.E.2d 26, 31 (N.C. Ct. App. 1986)(noting the rule is one
which frustrates intent). This rule is also known as the "repugnant to the grant rule." See
generally Tevis Herd, Deed Construction and the "Repugnant to the Grant" Doctrine, 21 TEX.
TECH. L. REV. 635 (1990) (discussing and criticizing use of rule).
5. 671 S.W.2d 870, 872 (Tex. 1984), overruled by Luckel v. White, 819 S.W.2d 459 (Tex.
1991).
6. The term "multiclause deed" will be used to refer to deeds with several provisions, in
addition to the granting clause, describing the interests conveyed. These additional provisions
include the "subject-to" clause and the "future-lease" clause. See generally, RICHARD W.
HEMINGWAY, THE LAW OF OIL AND GAS § 9.1, at 593-94 (3d ed. 1991). A deed form with a
granting clause, subject-to and future-lease clause has also been called a three-grant deed. See
Herd, supra note 4, at 637. That label is avoided herein because it improperly suggests that the
use of that deed form indicates an intention to make several conveyances in one instrument.
Instead, the history behind the development of this deed form reveals that it came into use to
insure that royalties and rentals passed proportionately with a single conveyance of a fractional
mineral interest. See infra part II.
7. 671 S.W.2d at 873.
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the delight of practicing attorneys, Alford was expressly overruled in
Luckel v. White.8 In that case, the Texas Supreme Court appears to have
reinstated ascertaining the intent of the parties from the four corners of
the document as the primary postulate in deed construction. 9 Unfortunately, however, Luckel and Jupiter Oil Co. v. Snow,' ° may also signal
the rebirth of another theory of construction which had a dubious presence in Texas case law prior to Alford: the two-grant doctrine. Under
this theory of construction, a multiclause deed is construed as making
separate grants of different types of interests in a particular tract of property or varying sizes of one interest at different times."
The purpose of this article is to explore the ramifications of the holdings in Luckel and Jupiter Oil and to expose the inappropriateness of
resurrecting the two-grant doctrine. Part I will review rules of construction in general and their use in Texas mineral and royalty conveyances in
particular. Part II will focus on the evolution of the two-grant doctrine
until its implicit demise in Alford. The doctrine is revealed as the unfortunate progeny of two aberrations in oil and gas jurisprudence. The first
is an overruled case which spawned the use of the multiclause deed form
used in Alford and Luckel.' 2 The second is the "estate misconception,"
which is the pervasive confusion about the estates owned by mineral
owners and their lessees.13
Part III will analyze Luckel v. White and Jupiter Oil Co. v. Snow.
The former opinion approves the approach of a pre-Alford supreme court
case, Garrett v. Dils Co. 4 In Garrett, the Texas court harmonized conflicting fractions in light of language in the entire deed and by taking
judicial notice of the fact that the royalty in most mineral deeds is oneeighth. However, whether Garrett can be hailed as replacing Alford is
not clear. In Luckel, the court slipped in and out of two-grant syntax,
and in Jupiter Oil it overtly applied that doctrine in an opinion that misuses authority and functions under the estate misconception."S To compound the confusion, the concurring opinions in both cases urged the
adoption of the dissent in Alford, but that opinion erroneously viewed
16
Garrett as a two-grant case.
8. 819 S.W.2d 459 (Tex. 1991).
9. Id. at 461.
10. 819 S.W.2d 466 (Tex. 1991).
11. See infra part II (discussing the two facets of the two-grant doctrine).
12. The case is Caruthersv. Leonard, 254 S.W. 779 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1923, judgm't
adopted), which is discussed fully in part II.
13. The "estate misconception" is explained fully in part II.
14. 159 Tex. 91, 299 S.W.2d 904 (1957). Garrett is discussed at length in part II.
15. See infra part II.
16. See infra part II (explaining that Garrett did not use the two-grant doctrine).
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Part IV will argue that the two-grant theory is not a viable rule of
construction under case law or the policy embraced in Luckel of effectuating the intent of the parties by harmonizing conflicting fractions from
the four comers of the deed. Instead, Luckel should be interpreted as a
reaffirmation of the Garrett v. Dils Co. approach and Jupiter Oil should
be discounted due to its faulty exegesis. To further promote title certainty, the Texas Supreme Court should define the contours of the Garrett approach by formulating fact-specific rules of construction in light of
the tainted origin of the multiclause deed and the pervasive misconceptions among drafters and courts about the estates owned by mineral owners and lessees. Adopting the Garrett approach would comply with the
malleable rules for document interpretation and would promote title
certainty more effectively than other methods of construction, such as
determining that all deeds with conflicting provisions are ambiguous.
Moreover, unlike the two-grant doctrine, it will also preserve the sanctity
of the parties' intent.
II.
A.

DEED CONSTRUCTION

In General

Once the written document supplanted the ceremony as a means of
conveying real property in England, the need for rules to interpret these
documents arose. By the seventeenth century, a lengthy list of rules had
been compiled by the common-law courts. Included on this list were the
following rules:
1) of two repugnant clauses in a deed the first should prevail; ....
2) words shall be construed according to the intent of the parties;
3) every part of the deed ought to be compared with the other and
one entire sense ought to be made thereof ....
4) in the common law the grant of every common person is taken
most strongly against himself and most favourably towards the
grantee;...
5) extrinsic evidence is not admissible to add to, alter, or contradict the terms of a deed .... "
17. HOLDSWORTH, supra note I, at 389-92 (citations omitted) (numbers added). At common law the rules regarding use of extrinsic evidence for interpretation were refined by Lord
Bacon who determined that no extrinsic evidence of any kind was admissible to remedy a
patent ambiguity, but evidence of intention was permisssible to solve a latent ambiguity. Id. at

392. The patent/latent distinction is not used by most courts today in determining the use of
extrinsic evidence in interpretation of documents. See CUNNINGHAM, supra note 1, § 11.1, at
717-18 (noting most courts freely admit testimony that will help resolve the ambiguity without
bothering to classify it as latent or patent).
This list includes both rules of construction and rules of law. The difference is that rules

of construction are applied if intended, while rules of law are applied to a certain set of facts
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This list is not exhaustive, but only representative of the laundry list approach that the courts developed. As the number of rules on this list
grew, it was clear, even to the judges themselves, that the real intent of
the parties was often disregarded."s
In the United States, the rules developed at common law are still
used today in construing deeds, wills, and contracts. 19 However, regardless of the document involved, ascertaining the intent of the parties has
become the "polestar" of construction.2" Therefore, rules which tend
to frustrate rather than elucidate the intent of the parties have been
wholly abrogated, or at least subordinated, by both statutes and judicial
decisions.21
B.
1.

Document Construction in Texas
In General

Whether the document at issue is a contract, deed, or will, Texas
courts have consistently proclaimed that the primary goal is to ascertain
regardless of the true intent of the parties. CORNELIUS J. MOYNIHAN, INTRODUCTION TO
ch. 6, § 2, at 144 (3d ed. 1988). One of the most notorious
rules of law developed at common law is the Rule in Shelley's Case. Id.
THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY,

18.

See

HOLDSWORTH,

supra note 1, at 393-94.

19. See, e.g., State Sec. Ins. Co. v. Burgos, 583 N.E.2d 547, 554 (Ill. 1991) (construing
insurance contract against drafter); Thomas v. Steuernol, 460 N.W.2d 577, 581 (Mich. Ct.
App. 1991) (construing deeds to pass greatest estate); Verzeano v. Carpenter, 815 P.2d 1275,
1278 (Or. Ct. App. 1991) (citing general rule that an ambiquity in a deed is construed against
the grantor, but noting an exception for reservation of an easement); Hornet's Nest Girl Scout
Council, Inc. v. Cannon Found. Inc., 339 S.E.2d 26, 31 (N.C. Ct. App. 1986) (applying repugnancy rule reluctantly).
20. See Gafford v. Kirby, 512 So. 2d 1356, 1360 (Ala. 1987) (calling the grantor's intent

the "polestar that guides us"). See also 6A

RICHARD

R.

POWELL, THE LAW OF REAL PROP-

§ 899[3], at 108 (Patrick J. Rohan et al. eds., 1988).
21. See, e.g., Luckel v. White, 819 S.W.2d 459, 464 (Tex. 1991) (rejecting rule that granting clause prevails when it conflicts with other provisions in favor of four-corners approach);
Hornet's Nest Girl Scout Council, Inc., v. Cannon Found., Inc., 339 S.E.2d 26, 31 (N.C. Ct.
App. 1986) (reluctantly following rule that granting clause prevails when repugnant to other
clauses, but recognizing it as "an inflexible rule of property which arbitrarily prefers certain
formal parts of the deed over the plainly expressed intent of the grantor"). See POWELL,
supra note 20, § 901[l], at 154 (repugnancy doctrine generally renounced). This change applies to both rules of law and rules of construction. See, e.g., TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 5.001
(Vernon 1984) (words required at common law to transfer fee no longer necessary); N.Y.
REAL PROPERTY LAW § 240 (McKinney 1992) (construing instruments of conveyance according to intent of parties); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 706.10 (West 1991) (passing all of an estate
unless a different intent is expressed or implicated). The most notorious rule of law that
crossed the Atlantic from England is probably the Rule in Shelley's Case. That rule has been
virtually abolished in the United States. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2107.49 (Baldwin
1991); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 551.8 (1974); MISS. CODE ANN. § 89-1-9 (1973); See also,
BERGIN & HASKELL, supra note 1, at 97. The rule tended to frustrate the grantor's intent
because words were given an unintended meaning. The rule had been formulated during the
era of feudalism but had survived as a rule of property. Id. at 94.
ERTY,
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the true intentions of the parties as expressed in the instrument.2 2 This
rule of construction is modified, however, by the caveat that it is not the
intent that the parties meant but failed to express, but the intention that
is expressed.2 3 If the document fails to reflect the parties' true intent due
24
to mutual mistake, the remedy is reformation, not construction.
When the court's task is construction, Texas follows the general rule
that intent is to be gathered from the four comers of the document. 25
The four-corners rule requires that the parties' intention be gathered
from the instrument as a whole and not from isolated parts.26 Extrinsic
evidence is not admissible unless the document is ambiguous.2 7 When an
28
ambiguity exists, a summary judgment is not proper.
In Texas, as in all jurisdictions, courts have articulated a consistent
litany of rules for determining whether an ambiguity exists. First, the
22. Coker v. Coker, 650 S.W.2d 391, 393 (Tex. 1983) (construing a contract); McMahon
v. Christmann, 157 Tex. 403, 407, 303 S.W.2d 341, 344 (1957) (interpreting an oil and gas
lease); Harris v. Windsor, 156 Tex. 324, 328, 294 S.W.2d 798, 800 (1956) (construing a deed);
Perfect Union Lodge No. 10 v. Interfirst Bank, 748 S.W.2d 218, 220 (Tex. 1988) (construing a
will).
23. Prairie Producing Co. v. Schlachter, 786 S.W.2d 409, 412 (Tex. App.-Texarkana
1990, writ denied); Harlan v. Vetter, 732 S.W.2d 390, 392 (Tex. App.-Eastland 1987, writ
ref'd n.r.e.).
24. Cherokee Water Co. v. Forderhause, 741 S.W.2d 377, 379 (Tex. 1987).
The underlying objective of reformation is to correct a mutual mistake made in preparing a written instrument, so that the instrument truly reflects the original agreement of the parties ....
By implication, then, reformation requires two elements:
(1) an original agreement and (2) a mutual mistake, made after the original agree-

ment, in reducing the original agreement to writing.
Id. at 379 (emphasis added).
25. See, e.g., Henderson v. Parker, 728 S.W.2d 768, 770 (Tex. 1987) (will construction);
City of Midland v. Waller, 430 S.W.2d 473, 478 (Tex. 1968) (contract construction); Ulbricht
v. Friedsam, 159 Tex. 607, 613, 325 S.W.2d 669, 673 (1959) (deed construction).
26. See, e.g., Mayfield v. de Benavides, 693 S.W.2d 500, 503 (Tex. App.-San Antonio
1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Shown v. Getty Oil Co., 645 S.W.2d 555, 559 (Tex. App.-San
Antonio 1982, writ ref'd). See also Republic Nat'l Bank v. Fredericks, 155 Tex. 79, 83, 283
S.W.2d 39, 43 (1955) (stating that the entire instrument should be considered).
27. Stauffer v. Henderson, 801 S.W.2d 858, 863 (Tex. 1990); Cherokee Water Co. v.
Forderhause, 641 S.W.2d 522, 525 (Tex. 1982) (considering whether extrinsic evidence is improper when the terms are unambiguous); see generally, HEMINGWAY, supra note 6, § 3.2, at
120 (3d ed. 1991). See CUNNINGHAM, supra note 1, at 717-18 (observing that most courts
today freely admit extrinsic evidence without the patent/latent distinction).
Texas courts generally do not use the latent/patent distinction, discussed supra note 18,
for determining whether extrinsic evidence is admissible in deed interpretation. See Neece v.
AAA Realty Co., 159 Tex. 403, 407, 322 S.W.2d 597, 600 n.3 (1959) ("The Baconian distinction between patent and latent ambiguities should be disregarded by the Texas courts.") (citing
2 CHARLES T. MCCORMICK & ROY R. RAY, TEXAS LAW OF EVIDENCE CIVIL AND CRIMINAL § 1683 (Texas Practice 3d ed. 1980)).
28. Reilly v. Rangers Management, Inc. 727 S.W.2d 527, 529 (Tex. 1987) (contract
construction).
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question of ambiguity is a question of law for the court. 2 9 The Texas
Supreme Court has stated that this determination is made "by looking at
the contract as a whole in light of the circumstances existing at the time
the contract was entered into."3 This statement does not permit consideration of extraneous evidence to determine the ambiguity question; instead, it directs how language in the document should be interpreted.3
If in light of surrounding circumstances the language appears to be capable of only a single meaning, the court will be confined to the writing. 2
If the language can be interpreted in different manners, rules of construction are used. An instrument is ambiguous only when the application of
these rules leaves it unclear which meaning is the correct one.3 3 If the
instrument can be harmonized, however, it is not ambiguous.3 4
The process of interpretation or construction, including the determination of ambiguity and the use of extrinsic evidence, is presented as
beguilingly precise, but scholars admit "the rules are complex, technical,
and difficult to apply.",35 The process also frequently frustrates the
29. Id.
30. Id. See also Houston Oilers, Inc. v. Floyd, 518 S.W.2d 836, 838 (Tex. Civ. App.Houston [1st Dist.] 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (construing the language of a release in light of
circumstances surrounding its execution). Extrinsic evidence of surrounding circumstances is
admissible to assist the court in determining the sense in which words were used. Kelley v.
Marlin, 714 S.W.2d 303, 305 (Tex. 1986); Kelly v. Womack, 153 Tex. 371, 377, 268 S.W.2d
903, 906 (1954) (stating that deference to intent is a cardinal principle and courts determine
intent from the language in conveyance, in light of the circumstances of its formulation).
31. See Reilly v. Rangers Management, Inc. 727 S.W.2d 527, 529 (Tex. 1987) (stating
that existence of an ambiguity is a question of law, not a question of fact).
32. Watkins v. Petro-Search, Inc., 689 F.2d 537, 538 (5th Cir. 1982). See also Kelley v.
Marlin, 714 S.W.2d 303, 305 (Tex. 1986) ("Since the parties agree that [the will] is unambiguous, parol evidence of what the testator intended is inadmissible. However, extrinsic evidence
of surrounding circumstances is admissible to ascertain the meaning of words used in the
will.") (citations omitted). Parol evidence will not be received except to explain an ambiguity.
Lewis v. East Texas Fin. Co., 136 Tex. 149, 154, 146 S.W.2d 977, 980 (1941); Lincoln Liberty
Life Ins. Co. v. Goodman, 535 S.W.2d 7, 11 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.)
(interpreting an insurance policy).
33. Prairie Producing Co. v. Schlachter, 786 S.W.2d 409, 413 (Tex. App.-Texarkana
1990, writ denied).
34. Id. See also Luckel v. White, 819 S.W.2d 459, 462 (Tex. 1991). The Texas cases have
not articulated the rules as a three-tiered process but the approach is similar to that set forth in
a Mississippi Supreme Court case which described the three-tiers as: 1) "the court will attempt
to ascertain intent by examining the language contained within the 'four corners' of the instrument in dispute;" 2) the use of applicable canons of contract construction; and 3) consideration
of extrinsic or parol evidence. Pursue Energy Corp. v. Perkins, 558 So. 2d 349, 351-53 (Miss.
1990). This process does not require that a court follow all three steps. Rather, subsequent
steps are taken only if intent remains unclear. Id.
35. See JOHN D. CALAMARI & JOSEPH M. PERILLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 3-16,
at 177 (3d ed. 1987). The authors also opine that:
There is no unanimity as to the content of the parol evidence rule or the process
called interpretation .... It would, however, be a mistake to suppose that the courts
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judges making the determination. For example, one Texas Supreme
Court Justice commented that, "I find it odd that all parties to this dispute, the trial court, the court of appeals, and this court agree that the
contract in question is clear as a bell and yet disagree as to its meaning. ''36 This is also evident in appellate cases that reverse the lower
courts' determinations of ambiguity a7 and in inconsistent opinions about
how conflicting provisions should be harmonized.38 Construction by
courts is also frequently constrained by the parties' failure to plead ambiguity, insisting, instead, that their opposing interpretations are unambiguously expressed.3 9
A preferable alternative to struggling with the amorphous nature of
the rules recited in the interpretation process is to adopt fact-specific
rules for construction of particular problems. This alternative has been
used by the Texas Supreme Court in construing specific problems encountered in mineral and royalty conveyances. 40 As argued in Part IV,
intent and title certainty could both be preserved if specific rules are also
follow any of these rules blindly, literally or consistently. As often as not they choose
the standard or the rule that they think will give rise to a just result in the particular
case. We have also seen that often under a guise of interpretation a court will actually enforce its notions of "public policy" which is "nothing more than an attempt to
do justice."
Id.
36. Criswell v. European Crossroads Shopping Ctr., Ltd., 792 S.W.2d 945, 950 (Tex.
1990) (Gonzalez, J.,dissenting). An appellate court justice expressed a similar concern in
1933:
To my mind, no more ambiguous instrument has ever been presented to me for construction .... Courts are concerned primarily with arriving at the intention of the
parties, and a slight variation from a clear expression in an instrument is sufficient to
create an ambiguity authorizing admission of oral testimony to determine the intent.
Jones v. Bedford, 56 S.W.2d 305, 309 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1933, writ ref'd) (Hickman,
C.J., dissenting):
37. See, e.g., Richardson v. Hart, 143 Tex. 392, 395, 185 S.W.2d 563, 564 (1945) (determining document was not ambiguous and reversing lower court's finding of ambiguity); Tipps
v. Bodine, 101 S.W.2d 1076, 1079 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1936, writ ref'd) (trial court
used remedy of reformation; appellate court affirms but on basis that deed is unambiguous).
38. See, e.g., Luckel v. White, 819 S.W.2d 459, 464 (Tex. 1991) (stating that the Alford
opinion fails to correctly harmonize the deed provisions); Woods v.Sims, 154 Tex. 59, 64, 273
S.W.2d 617, 620-21 (1955) (appellate decision fails to correctly harmonize deed provisions).
39. McMahon v. Christmann, 303 S.W.2d 341, 343 (1957) (interpreting an oil and gas
lease) ("As is often true in litigation involving the interpretation and construction of writtten
instruments both parties insist that the instrument is 'plain and unambiguous' and admits of no
reasonable meaning other than that for which they contend."). See also Garrett v. Dils Co.,
157 Tex. 92, 94, 299 S.W.2d 904, 906 (1957) (neither party claimed deed was ambiguous).
40. See, e.g., Averyt v. Grande, Inc., 717 S.W.2d 891, 895 (Tex. 1986) (adopting rule that
if deed reserves fraction of minerals under land "described" rather than "conveyed," it
reserves fraction of minerals under entire physical tract, regardless of part of mineral estate
actually conveyed); Moser v. United States Steel Corp., 676 S.W.2d 99, 101 (Tex. 1984)
(adopting ordinary and natural meaning test for construction of "other minerals" clauses).
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adopted for determining the quantum of interest conveyed in a multiclause mineral or royalty deed.
2.

Construction of Mineral and Royalty Deeds

The rules for construing deeds are basically the same as those for
construing other documents. The only distinguishing factor is the preference for rules that promote title certainty in order to facilitate the transfer of property rights.4 1 For example, in Moser v. United States Steel
Corp. ,42 the Texas Supreme Court rejected the surface destruction test in
favor of the ordinary and natural meaning test in construing "other minerals" clauses to promote the stability of land titles by avoiding the necessity of litigation to determine various fact issues.4 3 In Altman v. Blake,"
the Texas court again stressed the significance of promoting title certainty in adopting guidelines for determining whether a deed conveyed a
mineral or a royalty interest.45
In construing mineral and royalty conveyances, Texas courts follow
the general rule that ascertaining intent from the entire deed is the pri41. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW §§ 3.1, 3.10, at 30, 67-69
(3rd ed. 1986).
[The] legal protection of property rights creates incentives to use resources efficiently.
... In order to facilitate the transfer of resources from less to more valuable uses,
property rights, in principle, should be freely transferable.... Efficiency requires that
property rights be transferable; but if many people have a claim on each piece of
property, transfers will be difficult to manage.... Problems in transferring property
rights are part of a larger problem, that of deciding who owns what property.
Id. Concerning problems in the interpretation of oil and gas leases, see, e.g., Stephen F. Williams, Implied Covenantsin Oil and Gas Leases: Some GeneralPrinciples,29 U. KAN. L. REV.
153, 153 (1981) (arguing that formulas generally used to interpret lessor's duties under oil and
gas leases are vague and circular). Clarifying the rules for interpeting mineral deeds will produce lower transaction costs. See Joseph T. Janczyk, An Economic Analysis of the Land Title
Systems for TransferringReal Property,6 J. LEG. STUD. 213, 213 (1977) (asserting that complicated property rights raise transaction costs of transferring property).
42. 676 S.W.2d 99 (Tex. 1984).
43. Id. at 101; Altman v. Blake, 712 S.W.2d 117, 120 (Tex. 1986) (recognizing the necessity for stability and certainty in construction of mineral conveyances). Dean Eugene Kuntz
has noted, "In matters of land titles, and most certainly in the field of oil and gas where heavy
expenditures of capital are incident to exploration, development and production, certainty is of
the utmost importance." Eugene Kuntz, The Law Relating to Oil and Gas in Wyoming, 3
Wyo. L.J. 107, 114 (1949). It is debatable whether the Moser opinion in fact achieved its goal.
See Laura H. Burney, "Oil, Gas, and Other Minerals" Clauses in Texas: Who's on First?, 41
Sw. L.J. 695 (1987).
44. 712 S.W.2d 117 (Tex. 1986).
45. Id. at 120. The issue in Altman was whether a deed could be construed as a mineral
conveyance, rather than a royalty, when the grantee did not receive all the attributes of the
mineral estate, specifically the right to lease and the right to receive rentals. Id. at 117. The
court held that this did not prevent the deed from being construed as a mineral conveyance.
Id. at 120.
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mary goal.46 In this endeavor, many of the rules developed at common
law are used. For example, many cases, including one that is significant
for the purposes of this article, Garrett v. Dils Co., 7 have invoked the
rule that a document should be construed against the grantor to convey
the greatest estate possible.4 8 In Lott v. Lott,49 this rule was cited in con-

junction with the rule that "the granting clause prevails over other provisions of a deed." 50
In addition to using common law rules, Texas has also fashioned its
own rules for the construction of mineral or royalty deeds. The Moser
and Altman cases noted above are two instances in which the Texas
Supreme Court has clarified rules for construing specific problems encountered in mineral and royalty deeds. A more notorious example of a
Texas creation is the Duhig doctrine. 5 The two-grant doctrine, which is
analyzed in Part II, is another.5 2 The two-grant doctrine has two facets.
46. See Harris v. Windsor, 294 S.W.2d 798, 800 (Tex. 1956) ("[T]he intention of the
parties, when it can be ascertained from a consideration of all parts of the instrument, will be
given effect when possible."). Even Alford v. Krum, recognized that "the court must attempt
to harmonize all parts of a deed, since the parties to an instrument intend every clause to have
some effect and in some measure to evidence their agreement." 671 S.W.2d 870, 872 (Tex.
1984).
47. 157 Tex. 92, 95, 299 S.W.2d 904, 906 (1957).
48. See, e.g., Garrett v. Dils Co., 157 Tex. 92, 95, 299 S.W.2d 904, 906 (1957) (construing
deed against grantor); Lott v. Lott 370 S.W.2d 463, 465 (Tex. 1963) (construing deed to convey greatest estate possible); Waters v. Ellis, 158 Tex. 342, 347, 312 S.W.2d 231, 234 (1958)
(construing deed to convey greatest estate possible); Candlelight Hills Civic Ass'n Inc. v.
Goodwin, 763 S.W.2d 474, 477 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1989, writ denied) (construing deed to convey greatest estate to grantee); Brown v. Davila, 807 S.W.2d 12, 14 (Tex.
App.-Corpus Christi 1991, no writ) (construing document against grantor); Hoffman v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 273 S.W. 828, 829 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1925, holding approved) (construing deed to grant greatest estate to grantee); Humble Oil Co. v. Harrison, 146 Tex. 216,
205 S.W.2d 355, 360 (1947) (construing ambiguous language against grantee); Davis v. Huey,
620 S.W.2d 561, 565 (Tex. 1981) (construing document against the grantor). See also TempleEastex Inc. v. Addison Bank, 672 S.W.2d 793, 798 (Tex. 1984) (construing writing against
author); Republic Nat'l Bank v. Northwest Nat'l Bank, 578 S.W.2d 109, 115 (Tex. 1979) (construing contract against author and construing to give validity).
49. 370 S.W.2d 463 (Tex. 1963).
50. Id. at 465 (citing Waters v. Ellis, 158 Tex. 342, 347, 312 S.W.2d 231, 234 (1958)).
Both Lott and Ellis were relied upon by the Texas Supreme Court in Alford v. Krum, 671
S.W.2d 870, 872 (Tex. 1984). Tevis Herd has demonstrated that these cases do not justify the
holding in Alford. See Herd, supra note 4, at 648-49 (Lott and Ellis based on validation doctrine not repugnant-to-the-grant rule).
51. See Duhig v. Peavy-Moore Lumber Co., 135 Tex. 503, 144 S.W.2d 878 (1940). The
Duhig doctrine provides that where the conveyance represents that the grantor is the owner of
a particular interest in property and such interest is conveyed by the deed, the grantor is
estopped by his convenant of general warranty to claim that the deed conveyed a less estate
than the grantor's ownership. Duhig, 135 Tex. at 507, 144 S.W.2d at 880. See generally HEMINGWAY, supra note 6, § 3.2, at 129.
52. See Hoffman v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 273 S.W. 828 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1925,
holding approved). In discussing the two-grant doctrine, Professor Smith notes that Texas has
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Under the first, deeds have been construed as conveying two different
interests in one tract of land, for example, one interest in the land and
another in royalties due under an existing lease.1 3 Under the second
facet, a deed is construed as conveying one interest in two different sizes
at different times. 4 In 1984, in Alford v. Krum," the Texas Supreme
Court implicitly rejected the second facet in favor of the rule that the
granting clause prevails when there are conflicts with other clauses.5 6
3.

The Rise and Fall of Alford v. Krum

Prior to 1984, the Texas court had continually embraced principles
for construction of mineral and royalty conveyances that are antithetical
to preferring one clause in a document. For example, in 1957, the Texas
Supreme Court made the following commentary on the use of common
law rules in deed construction:
We have long since relaxed the strictness of the ancient rules for
the construction of deeds, and have established the rule for the
construction of deeds as for the construction of all contracts,-that
the intention of the parties, when it can be ascertained from a consideration of all parts of the instrument, will be given effect when
possible. That
5 7 the intention, when ascertained, prevails over arbitrary rules.
The Texas court also repeatedly required an attempt to harmonize
all parts of a deed, because "the parties to an instrument intend every
clause to have some effect and in some measure to evidence their agreement . . .,,s
In spite of the foregoing pronouncements by the Texas Supreme
Court, in 1984 the court gave one arbitrary rule preeminent status in
"given birth to far more than its fair share of unfortunate oil and gas conveyancing doctrines."

Ernest E. Smith, The "Subject To" Clause, 30 ROCKY MTN.MIN. L. INST. 15-1, § 15.02[l]
(1985). It is the purpose of this article to suggest that the two-grant doctrine is another "un-

fortunate" doctrine that should be denounced.
53. See Hoffman v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 273 S.W. 828 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1925,
holding approved); Wood v. Sims, 154 Tex. 59, 273 S.W.2d 617 (1954) (construing deed as
conveying two different interests in one tract of land). See infra part II for a thorough discussion of both facets of the two-grant doctrine.
54. See Jupiter Oil Co. v. Snow, 819 S.W.2d 466, 468 (Tex. 1991). See infra part II for a
thorough discussion of this facet.
55. 671 S.W.2d 870 (Tex. 1984).
56. Id. at 873. See infra part II.
57. Harris v. Windsor, 156 Tex. 324, 328, 294 S.W.2d 798, 800 (1956).
58. Woods v. Sims, 154 Tex. 59, 64, 273 S.W.2d 617, 620 (1954); see also Garrett v. Dils
Co., 157 Tex. 92, 96-97, 299 S.W.2d 904, 907 (1957) (construing the deed as a whole to determine the intent of the parties); Humble Oil & Ref. Co. v. Harrison, 146 Tex. 216, 224, 205
S.W.2d 355, 359 (1947) (construing deed as a whole to conclude that an undivided one-half
interest was conveyed).
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deed construction. In Alford v. Krum,5 9 the court held that "when there
is an irreconcilable conflict between clauses of a deed, the granting clause
prevails over all other provisions."' The deed at issue in Alford was a
multiclause deed which attempted to convey a fraction of the grantor's
mineral estate.61 The granting clause of the deed used the fraction "onehalf of the one-eighth interest in and to all of the oil, gas and other minerals." 62 Another clause recited that the sale is made subject-to an existing oil and gas lease but "covers and includes 1/16 of all the oil royalty
... due and to be paid under the terms of said lease."' 63 A final clause,
the future-lease clause, provided that if the existing lease terminated, the
grantees would own "a one-half interest in all oil, gas and other minerals
in and upon said land, together with one-half interest in all future
rents." 64 The supreme court held that an irreconcilable conflict existed
between the granting clause and the future lease clause that must be resolved in favor of "the clear and unambiguous language of the granting
65
clause.",
Chief Justice Pope dissented and argued for the adoption of the
method used in Garrett v. Dils Co. 66 Although most commentators consider Garrett as rejecting or ignoring the two-grant doctrine, 67 Pope interpreted it as using the doctrine and holding that two separate estates
were granted under the granting clause and the future lease clause.68
Alford was soundly criticized by the bench and bar.6 9 In 1991, the
Texas Supreme Court expressly overruled it in Luckel v. White.70 The
59. 671 S.W.2d 870 (Tex. 1984).
60. Id. at 872. The majority in the civil appeals decision had also decided the deed was
unambiguous. See Krum v. Alford, 653 S.W.2d 464, 466 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1982),
rev'd, 671 S.W.2d 870 (Tex. 1984). However, in that opinion it was determined that the deed
conveyed a 1/16 interest under the existing lease which increased to an undivided 1/2 interest.
Id.
61. The history behind the use of this type of deed is explained in part II.
62. Alford, 671 S.W.2d at 871.
63. Id. at 872.
64. Id. at 873.
65. Id. at 874. See generally, Herd, supra note 4 (criticizing the Alford decision).
66. Alford, 671 S.W.2d at 876 (Pope, C.J., dissenting). See infra note 128.
67. See, e.g., HEMINGWAY, supra note 6, § 9.1, at 593 (stating that court departed from
two-grant doctrine in Garrett); 2 HOWARD R. WILLIAMS & CHARLES J. MEYERS, OIL AND
GAS LAW § 340.2, at 242-43 (1991) (Garrett ignored two-grant theory); Herd, supra note 4, at
654 (viewing Garrett as using the four-corers rule).

68. Alford, 671 S.W.2d at 876 (Pope, C.J., dissenting). Chief Justice Pope viewed the
future lease clause as "the ridgepole that divides the rights conveyed before reverter from those
conveyed after the reversion." Id. at 874.
69. See Jupiter Oil Co. v. Snow, 802 S.W.2d 354, 358 (Tex. App.-Eastland 1990), rev'd,
819 S.W.2d 466 (Tex. 1991) (suggesting that the supreme court reconsider Alford). See also,
Herd, supra note 4 (criticizing the repugnant to the grant rule and Alford).
70. 819 S.W.2d 459, 464 (Tex. 1991).
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deed in Luckel was similar to that in Alford since different fractions were
used in separate clauses of the conveyance. 71 The court held that "the
majority in Alford incorrectly failed to harmonize the provisions under
the four comers rule and then erred in applying the 'repugnant to the
grant' rule in disregard of the future lease clause.",72 Although the fraction 1/32 was used in the granting clause and 1/4 in the future lease
clause, the court held the deed was "properly harmonized to mean that
the interest conveyed was one-fourth of the royalties reserved under the
existing and all future leases."

73

In Luckel, the fraction in the granting clause was not accepted as
written but interpreted in light of the other clauses. This would indicate
that the two-grant doctrine was not used. However, the concurring and
dissenting opinions in Luckel seem to disagree about whether the majority used the doctrine. The concurrence felt compelled to urge the express
adoption of Pope's dissent in Alford,7 4 while the dissent criticized the
majority for finding two grants.7 5
In a case decided the same day, JupiterOil Co. v. Snow, 76 which also

involved the use of different fractions in separate deed clauses, the court
held that Luckel's holding regarding Alford did not apply because the
deed unambiguously conveyed one interest under an existing lease that
expanded into a larger interest at its termination.7 7 This differs from the
holding in Luckel since the fraction in the granting clause was enforced
as written. No attempt was made to harmonize it in light of the fractions
used in other clauses.
After Luckel and Jupiter, it is clear that the rule that the granting
clause prevails is no longer the litmus test for intent in deed construction.
The question remains, however, whether, in the construction of mineral
or royalty conveyances with conflicting fractions in separate clauses, the
court has adopted a liberal four comers approach requiring harmonizing
the fractions, or the blanket use of the two-grant doctrine, which would
enforce the conflicting fractions as written. To answer this query, the
evolution of the two-grant doctrine will be reviewed and the decisions in
Luckel and Jupiter will be closely analyzed.
71. Luckel was different in that it was clearly a royalty deed and Alford involved a mineral deed. The Luckel court determined that this difference would not affect the rules of construction used. Id. at 463-64.
72. Id. at 464.
73. Id. at 465. The court also held that the grantee was not to receive less than 1/32 of
production, which was one-fourth of the usual one-eighth royalty.
74. Id. at 465 (Mauzy, J., concurring).
75. Id. at 466 (Phillips, C.J., dissenting).
76. 819 S.W.2d 466 (Tex. 1991).
77. Id. at 467 & n.1, 469.
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A.

Background

1.

The Multiclause Deed

It is evident from the review in Part I that the controversial conveyances involve documents with two or three main divisions: 1) the granting clause, which is similar to clauses in other real property conveyances;
2) the subject-to clause, which informs that the conveyance is made subject to an existing lease and covers and includes the benefits of that lease;
and 3) the future-lease clause, which provides for ownership rights after
the existing lease expires.78 This form is referred to as a three-grant
deed.79 That label is a misnomer, however, because it assumes that multiple conveyances are intended. Instead, this deed form was developed to
clearly express the intent to make a single conveyance of a fractional
mineral interest and the rights appurtenant thereto.
The three-grant or multiclause deed was created in response to an
early Texas case, Caruthers v. Leonard,8 ° which held that when a grantee
received an interest in a mineral estate that was already under lease, only
a reversionary interest passed-not the delay rentals, and presumably,
not the royalties. 8 ' This suggests that economic benefits would only pass
if expressly assigned. Thus, the three-grant deed came into vogue, not to
provide parties with a mode for making separate conveyances in one
deed, but to insure that a single grant of a fractional mineral interest
included a proportionate interest in benefits under existing and future
leases.8 2
Leonard has been overruled.83 Texas now recognizes the prevailing
view that a fractional conveyance of the mineral estate carries with it, as
appurtenances, a like fraction of the economic benefits of the mineral
estate.8 4 These benefits include the right to receive royalties, bonus payments, and delay rentals, as well as the right to lease, or the executive
right.85 Therefore, a grantor wishing to convey a 1/2 mineral interest
78. See HEMINGWAY, supra note 6, § 9.1, at 593-94 (3d ed. 1991). Professor Smith has
explained that the prime function of the subject-to clause is to protect the grantor against a
breach of warranty claim when the property he is conveying is already leased. Smith, supra
note 51, §§ 15.01, 15.2.
79. Herd, supra note 4, at 637.
80. 254 S.W. 779 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1923, judgm't adopted).
81. Id. at 782. See also Smith, supra note 52, § 15.02, (arguing royalties are apparently
not payable under the lease).
82. See Smith, supra note 52, § 15.02[2].
83. Harris v. Currie, 142 Tex. 93, 176 S.W.2d 302 (1943).
84. Day Co. v. Texland Petroleum, 786 S.W.2d 667, 669 n.1 (Tex. 1990).
85. Id. See generally HEMINGWAY, supra note 6, § 9.1, at 592.
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and a like interest in the appurtenant rights can do so by simply conveying a 1/2 mineral interest, regardless of an existing lease. This will be
sufficient to entitle the grantee to 1/2 of the benefits under the existing
and future leases.
Forms used today reflect this understanding and provide space for
only one fraction. a6 Unfortunately, the legacy of Caruthers v. Leonard
has been the extensive use of multiclause or three-grant deeds, which
require the parties to fill in a fraction in three different clauses. Since
drafters and the judiciary frequently misconstrue the estates created by
an oil and gas lease, this seemingly perfunctory task has resulted in conflicting fractions that have plagued the courts in deed construction cases.
2.

The Estate Misconception

Shortly after the discovery of oil and gas in commercial quantities at
the turn of the century, courts were faced with numerous questions for
which the common law provided few direct answers. The conceptual
grappling with the economic benefits of the mineral estate in Caruthersv.
Leonard is one example.8 7 Another issue that immediately perplexed the
courts concerned the estates created in the lessor and the lessee by an oil
and gas lease.88 In Stephens County v. Mid-Kansas Oil & Gas Co.," the
Texas Supreme Court determined that an oil and gas lease creates a fee
simple determinable in the lessee in the mineral estate.9" The lessee owns
this fee in the entire mineral estate. The lessor retains the future interest
that accompanies a fee simple determinable, a possibility of reverter, in
86. 6 WEST'S TEXAS FORMS § 1.3, at 28 (2d ed. 1991). The multiclause deed form is also
still used. See id. § 1.4, at 30-31.
87. Caruthers v. Leonard, 254 S.W. 779, 782 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1923, judgm't
adopted). See also Railroad Comm'n v. Manziel, 361 S.W.2d 560, 568 (Tex. 1962) (rejecting
application of common-law trespass rules in determining if trespass occurred in secondary
recovery project); Schlittler v. Smith, 128 Tex. 628, 629, 101 S.W.2d 543, 544 (1937) (questioning whether royalty owner was entitled to bonus and delay rental payments); Hager v. Stakes,
116 Tex. 453, 471, 294 S.W. 835, 840 (1927) (comparing royalties to rents and determining
that royalties are real property for taxation purposes); Humble Oil & Ref. Co. v. Kishi, 276
S.W. 190, 191 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1925, judgm't adopted) (fashioning remedy for damage to
leasing value where common-law remedies proved inadequate). The struggle with oil and gas
estate concepts continues. See Day & Co. v. Texland Petroleum, 786 S.W.2d 667, 669 (Tex.
1990) (determining that the executive right is realty, reversing earlier cases treating it as
personalty).
88. See Stephens County v. Mid-Kansas Oil & Gas Co., 113 Tex. 160, 254 S.W. 290
(1923). See generally A. W. Walker Jr., Fee Simple Ownership of Oil and Gas, 6 TEX. L. REV.
125, 126-28 (1928); A. W. Walker, Jr., The Nature of the Property Interests Created by an Oil
and Gas Lease in Texas, 7 TEX. L. REV. 1 (1928).
89. 113 Tex. 160, 254 S.W. 290 (1923).
90. Id. at 295. This is the estate created when an "unless" lease, rather than an "or"
lease is used. See generally HEMINGWAY, supra note 6, § 6.2, at 285-86.
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the whole estate. 9 Pursuant to the lease terms, the lessor also has a right
to royalties, delay rentals, and other economic benefits and is permitted
to explore for oil and gas and retain a portion of production. During the
lease, the lessee has the right to develop all of the oil and gas. When the
lease expires, the lessor regains possessory rights in the entire mineral
estate due to the possibility of reverter.9 2
Since most leases provide for a 1/8 royalty, however, drafters and
courts perceived the estate to be a fee simple determinable in only 7/8 in
the lessee, with the lessor retaining a 1/8 fee interest.9 3 This misconception stems from a failure to distinguish between the mineral estate
owner's right to receive royalties and the value placed on that right in the
lease. Although the lessor only retains a 1/8 royalty interest, the lessor
still has a possibility of reverter in the entire mineral estate. Similarly,
91. BERGIN & HASKELL, supra note 1, at 58. Bergin and Haskell describe the possibility
of reverter as follows: "A possibility of reverter is the future interest a transferor keeps when
he transfers an estate whose maximum potential duration equals that of the estate he had to
start with and attaches a special limitation that operates in his own favor." Id. Applying this
concept to an oil and gas lease, the lessor has conveyed the "estate he had to start with" (a fee
simple estate in the minerals) but has attached a limitation, the production of oil and gas in
paying quantities. When that condition is breached, the lessor will again have unencumbered
rights in the whole mineral estate.
92. See Stephens County, 113 Tex. at 173, 254 S.W. at 295 ("The instruments... passed
to appellee determinable fees in the lands; leaving in the grantors, their heirs or assigns, the
possibility of reacquiring the absolute fee-simple titles, less whatever minerals may be
meantime produced and marketed.").
93. See Jupiter Oil Co. v. Snow, 819 S.W.2d 466, 468 (Tex. 1991); McBride v. Hutson,
157 Tex. 632, 637, 306 S.W.2d 888, 891 (1957). In McBride, the issue was whether a conveyance by the grantor of a 1/3 interest in minerals that were under lease was a grant of 1/3 of
7/8 or 1/3 of 8/8 of the grantor's minerals. The court relied on Stephens and held that the
grant was 1/3 of 7/8 since the grantor's reversion was only in 7/8, not 8/8 of the minerals. Id.
In Tipps v. Bodine, the appellate court assumed that the fraction 1/16 is proper to convey 1/2
of the minerals when that estate is under lease. 101 S.W.2d 1076, 1079 (Tex. Civ App.Texarkana 1936, writ ref'd).
Early Texas Supreme Court cases that decided whether royalties should be treated as
realty or personalty for tax purposes contributed to the misconceptions. See Hager v. Stakes
116 Tex. 453, 471, 294 S.W. 835, 840 (1927). Hagerheld that the lease at issue only invested
the lessee with a 7/8 interest because the oil royalty was payable in kind; it distinquished
Stephens since the lease at issue there provided that the lessee at his option could pay the
stipulated royalties in oil or cash. Id. at 839. Most leases today give the lessee the option of
paying royalty in kind or in cash. The prevailing view is that the royalty payment is real
property, although payable in money, and the oil and gas lease is viewed as placing the entire
mineral estate in the lessee. See State v. Quintana Petroleum Co., 134 Tex. 179, 186, 133
S.W.2d 112, 115 (1939); Sheffield v. Hogg, 124 Tex. 290, 297, 77 S.W.2d 1021, 1025 (1934)
(disapproving of unnecessary dicta in Hager); see generally HEMINGWAY, supra note 6, § 2.5,
at 59 n.94, 61.
Other jurisdictions have emphasized the estate misconception in deed construction. See,
e.g., Heyen v. Hartnett, 679 P.2d 1152, 1158 (Kan. 1984).
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although the lessee only has a right to 7/8 of production after costs, the
lessee still owns a fee simple determinable in 8/8 of the minerals.
The estate misconception leads to the use of conflicting fractions in a
multiclause deed. For example, a lessor who has leased the entire mineral estate, but desires to sell-one half of the minerals, would assume that
he owned 1/8 of the minerals due to the existing lease. Therefore, the
lessor would use the fraction 1/16, or a double fraction, 1/2 of 1/8, to
convey 1/2 of what he perceived he owned. In the subject-to clause, he
would use the fraction 1/2 to insure that the grantee got 1/2 of the 1/8
royalty provided for in the existing lease. The lessor would also use the
fraction 1/2 in the future lease clause, since he perceives that when the
existing lease terminates, his interest then becomes 8/8 rather than 1/8. 9"
B.

Development of the Two-Grant Doctrine

The two-grant doctrine, as it has been applied by various Texas
courts, has two facets. One involves using the theory to hold that two
different interests, the royalty and the mineral interest, have been conveyed in a single deed in a particular tract of land. The second facet
involves construing a multiclause deed as conveying the same interest,
either a mineral or royalty interest, in different sizes at different times.
1.

The Hoffman Facet

Ironically, the case that propagated the two-grant doctrine did not
involve the use of conflicting fractions or thrive on the estate misconception. The three-grant or multiclause deed, however, does provide the format for development of the doctrine. In Hoffman v. Magnolia Petroleum
Co.,95 the grantor, who owned 320 acres that were under lease to an oil
company, conveyed a one-half interest in the oil, gas, and other minerals
under a certain 90 of the 320 acres to the grantee. The controversy
stemmed from the subject-to clause, which provided that "it is understood and agreed that this sale is made subject to said lease, but covers
and includes one-half of all the oil royalty and gas rental or royalty due
to be paid under the terms of said lease." 96 The grantee claimed that this
clause entitled him to one-half of all royalty payable under the entire
lease rather than restricting him to one-half of the royalty from wells
drilled on the 90 acres granted to him. The Texas Commission of Ap94. See generally HEMINGWAY, supra note 6, § 9.1. See also WILLIAMS & MEYERS,
supra note 66, § 340.2, at 242-43 (explaining that double fractions are often used due to what
this author has coined "estate misconception").
95. 273 S.W. 828 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1925, judgm't adopted).
96. Id. at 830.
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peals agreed, holding that the granting clause conveyed the one-half mineral interests in the 90 acres to the grantee and that the subject-to clause
operated as a second grant that conveyed a one-half interest in the royalty under the entire 320 acre tract. 97 Thus, in 1925, the unfortunate
legacy of Caruthers v. Leonard was realized, and the two-grant doctrine
was born.
This facet of the doctrine was subsequently used in three supreme
court cases. The first was Richardson v. Hart9" in 1945. The case involved construction of a multiclause deed, but the same double fraction,
1/16 of 1/8, was used in each clause. 99 The appellate court had determined that the deed was ambiguous and affirmed the trial court's consideration of the parties' construction of the instrument."° The Texas
Supreme Court, however, determined that the deed was not ambiguous,
but clearly "conveyed two separate and distinct estates in the land." ''
The first was determined to be 1/16 of 1/8 or a 1/128 interest in the oil,
gas, and minerals, and the second estate was 1/128 of the royalties paid
under any lease (1/8 of 1/128 or 1/1024).102
The Hart decision is troublesome for two reasons. First, it assumes
that it is logical for parties to use double fractions to convey a fractional
interest in the mineral estate. The court was evidently unimpressed that
one of the two fractions in the equation was the same as the royalty in the
existing lease, 1/8. Yet, this should be considered patent evidence that
the parties were functioning under the estate misconception and intended
to convey a 1/16 mineral interest and the royalty that would be appurtenant thereto, 1/8 of 1/16. This would explain the use of the double frac03
tion, a question left unanswered by the court.
Second, the court discounted the fact that the supposed "second
conveyance" would follow as a matter of law from the holding that a
97.
98.

Id.
143 Tex. 392, 185 S.W.2d 563 (1945).

99. Id. at 394, 185 S.W.2d at 563.
100. Richardson v. Hart, 183 S.W.2d 235, 237 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1944), modified, 143 Tex. 392, 185 S.W.2d 563 (1945).
101. Hart, 143 Tex. at 396, 185 S.W.2d at 564.
102. Id. at 396, 185 S.W.2d at 565. (showing subsequent lease provided for a 1/8 royalty).
103. See WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 67, § 327.2. Williams and Meyers recognize
that the use of the double fraction results from the parties' mistaken conception that they own
a 1/8 interest; they consider, however, that as a matter of construction the deed is unambiguous, and if a mistake was made, the proper remedy is reformation. Id. In Richardson v. Hart,
the court of appeals found that the successors to the parties to the deed had treated it as
conveying a 1/128 mineral interest. 183 S.W.2d at 236. However, in the supreme court, the
appellant argued that the use of the double fraction "1/16 of 1/8" was intended to convey
1/16 of 1/8 of all the royalty. Richardson, 143 Tex. at 396, 185 S.W.2d at 564. A 1/16
mineral interest would entitle a grantee to 1/16 of 1/8 of the royalty.
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1/128 mineral interest had been conveyed: "The fact that it fixes the
share in the present royalties the same as would have obtained by operation of law does not lessen its force and effect as a conveyance. As is
often the case such payment of royalty might have been larger or smaller
than a pro rata share. '" 1"4
By emphasizing the truism that mineral owners can convey royalties
under an existing lease in a proportion different from the size of the mineral estate conveyed, the opinion in Richardson v. Hart detracts from the
fact that parties rarely intend to do so.105 From this premise, the court
proceeded to use the two-grant doctrine when it was unnecessary and
propagated a rule of construction that detracts from the parties' true
intent.
1 °6 the Texas court
In a 1953 case, Benge v. Scharbauer,
again championed the right of parties to provide for disproportionate conveyances of
mineral and royalty interests and achieved new levels of absurdity when
the two-grant doctrine was applied in conjunction with the Duhig doctrine. In Benge, the grantor conveyed land to the grantee and reserved a
3/8 mineral interest."7 The deed also gave the grantee the right to execute all future leases but required that "said leases shall provide for the
payment of three-eight[h]s (3/8) of all the bonuses, rentals and royalties
to the grantors." 10 8 Under Duhig, the grantor's mineral interest was reduced from 3/8 to 1/8.109 However, the court held that the grantor was
entitled to 3/8 of royalty, bonus, and rentals, because to hold otherwise
would suggest that "the parties are powerless" to provide for disproportionate conveyances of mineral and royalty, bonus, and rentals.11 0
A year later, in Woods v. Sims,"'1 the Texas Supreme Court relied
on Benge, Hart, and Hoffman to further propagate the view that three104. Hart, 143 Tex. at 396, 185 S.W.2d at 565.
105. See WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 67 ("The oft-repeated expression that a
grantor has the power to convey by one instrument different interests in the possibility of
reverter and under the subsisting lease should not obscure the fact that very few grantors really
intend to convey interests of different magnitude.").
106. 152 Tex. 447, 259 S.W.2d 166 (1953).
107. Id. at 450, 259 S.W.2d at 167.

108.

Id. at 452, 259 S.W.2d at 168.

109. Id. Duhig applied because there was an outstanding 1/4 mineral interest in a third
party. Id.
110. Benge, 152 Tex. at 454, 259 S.W.2d at 169. Professors Meyers and Williams labeled
this opinion "deplorable" since it created a mineral interest "something like the Cheshire Cat
of Alice in Wonderland: '. . . and this time it vanished quite slowly, beginning with the end of
the tail, and ending with the grin, which remained some time after the rest of it had gone.' "
Charles J. Meyers & Howard R. Williams, Hoffman v. Magnolia Petroleum Co.: A Further
Comment, 35 TEX. L. REV. 363, 371 (1957).
111. 154 Tex. 59, 273 S.W.2d 617 (1954).
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grant mineral deeds convey separate and distinct estates in land. 1'2 Ironically, most of these opinions also. recited four corners principles.' 1 3
Their holdings subvert those principles, however, by using the two-grant
doctrine to justify viewing separate clauses in isolation.
The repeated use of the first facet of the two-grant doctrine by the
Texas Supreme Court from 1925 to 1955 deceptively suggests that it was
settled precedent for construing a deed to convey separate, and usually
disproportionate, interests in minerals and royalties. Yet, the doctrine
was frequently ignored or discounted during this period. In 1933, the
commission of appeals, in Mitchell v. Simms," 4 overturned the lower
court's application of the two-grant theory with facts very similar to
those in Hoffman. 1 5 In Humble Oil & Refining Co. v. Harrison,'16 the
supreme court again ignored the Hoffman analysis," 7 and in 1957, an
appellate court painstakingly distinguished it in Robinson v. Humble Oil
& Refining Co. 1 8
In spite of the ethereal presence of the two-grant doctrine from 1925
to 1957, it must be recognized that the Texas Supreme Court had approved one facet of the doctrine: its application to hold that two different, and usually disproportionate, interests-the mineral and royalty, can
be created by one deed in a particular tract of land. The second facet,
112. Id. at 65, 273 S.W.2d at 621. In Woods, a multiclause deed used the fraction 25/200
in every clause. In one clause, however, it was provided that an undivided 25 acre mineral
interest was conveyed. Id. at 64, 273 S.W.2d at 620. It was subsequently determined that the
grantor owned 226.88 acres rather than 200. The court held that the deed conveyed a
25/226.88 mineral interest but a 25/200 interest in the royalty. Id. The disproportionate
interests were justified "[s]ince different estates in the minerals in place and in the royalty
payable under the lease may be conveyed by the same instrument." Id. at 65, 273 S.W.2d at
621.
113. Id. at 64, 273 S.W.2d at 620-21 (stating that court will construe contradictory parts
of an instrument to harmonize with one another and not strike down a part unless the conflict
is irreconcilable); Benge, 152 Tex. at 451, 259 S.W.2d at 167 (holding that all parts of the
instrument must be given effect if possible and court must construe the language of the instrument to harmonize); Hoffman v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 273 S.W. 828, 830 (Tex. Comm'n
App. 1925, judgm't adopted) (stating that instrument must be made to speak consistently as a
whole).
114. 63 S.W.2d 371 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1933, holding approved).
115. See id. at 373-74. Professor Williams opined that this case cast considerable doubt on
the validity of the Hoffman rule. See Howard R. Williams, Hoffman v. Magnolia Petroleum
Co.: The 'Subject To' Clause in Mineral and Royalty Deeds, 30 TEX. L. REV. 395, 417 (1952).
116. 146 Tex. 216, 205 S.W.2d 355 (1947).
117. Id. at 225, 205 S.W.2d at 360. Compare with Hoffman, 273 S.W. at 830 (Humble
holding the document ambiguous, whereas Hoffman used the two-grant theory to hold the
deed unambiguous). The majority in Humble cited Hoffman, but only for the proposition that
"where the language of the grant is ambiguous, it is to be construed against grantors rather
than against grantee." Humble, 146 Tex. at 224, 205 S.W. at 360. Professor Williams considered Humble an implicit rejection of Hoffman. See Williams, supra note 115, at 417-19.
118. 301 S.W.2d 938, 946 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1957, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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using the doctrine to hold that either a mineral or royalty interest is conveyed in different sizes at different times, was not embraced by the
supreme court until Jupiter Oil.11 9 Instead, the court had ignored the
expansion facet in Garrett v. Dils Co. 120 in 1957, when presented with
12 3
12
12
facts very similar to those in Alford, ' Luckel, ' and Jupiter Oil.
Without mentioning Garrett,the appellate court in Alford held that
the expansion facet should be applied.12 4 That opinion was reversed by
the supreme court and should be considered as a rejection of the expansion facet.12 With Alford overruled, the question becomes whether the
two-grant theory's expansion facet should or could be resurrected.
2.

The Expansion Facet

The appellate court in Alford decided that the deed was unambiguous and could be construed under the expansion facet of the two-grant
doctrine. 126 Therefore, it held that the deed conveyed an undivided 1/16
mineral interest under an existing lease (since the double fraction 1/2 of
1/8 was used in the granting clause), which expanded to a 1/2 interest
after the termination of that lease (since that fraction was used in the
future-lease clause).1 27 The opinion cites three cases, none of which mention or apply either facet of the two-grant doctrine.1 2 1 It does cite
119.
120.

Jupiter Oil Co. v. Snow, 819 S.W.2d 466 (Tex. 1992).
157 Tex. 92, 299 S.W.2d 904, 906-07 (1957) (see discussion of Garrett, infra parts

III.B.3, V).
121. Alford v. Krum, 671 S.W.2d 870 (Tex. 1984).
122. Luckel v. White, 819 S.W.2d 459 (Tex. 1991).
123. Jupiter, 819 S.W.2d at 466.
124. Krum v. Alford, 653 S.W.2d 464, 466 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1983), rev'd, 671
S.W.2d 870 (Tex. 1984). The court does not use the term "expansion facet." That is this
author's term. However, the court does use the concept.
125. Alford, 671 S.W.2d at 874. In a post-Alford decision, an appellate court determined
that Alford had negated the expansion facet where a clause irreconcilably conflicts with the
granting clause, but had not negated the Hoffman facet. See Hawkins v. Texas Oil and Gas
Corp., 724 S.W.2d 878, 886 (Tex. App.-Waco 1987, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (tracing history of
Hoffman facet and determining it is still viable since Alford involved expansion).
126. The court does not use the term "expansion facet."
127. Alford, 653 S.W.2d at 466.
128. Id. The first case cited is Associated Oil Co. v. Hart, 277 S.W. 1043 (Tex. Comm'n
App. 1925, judgm't adopted). The issue in that case was whether a grant of property, described by metes and bounds, and a subsequent reservation of all minerals under the property
was void for repugnancy. Id. at 1043. The court held it was not void because the grant was
general and the reservation specific. Id. at 1044. Therefore, the effect of the deed was to create
a permissible severance of the mineral and surface estates. Id. at 1045. The case does not
involve the construction of a multiclause deed with conflicting fractions. Therefore, it is not
authority for either facet of the two-grant doctrine. Instead, the opinion urges the rejection of
arbitrary rules in favor of ascertaining the intent of the parties from the whole document. Id.
at 1044.
The second case relied upon is Texas and Pac. R.R. Co. v. Martin, 123 Tex. 383, 71
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and Hart,13 ° but only for the proposition that different estates
in minerals may be conveyed by the same instrument. 131 Its only menWoodS

129

S.W.2d 867 (1934). This case does not involve a multiclause deed, a conveyance or a reservation of oil, gas, or minerals. The issue is whether a deed that granted land "for depot purposes
and uses" conveyed an easement or a fee. Id. at 386, 71 S.W.2d 869, 869.
The third case cited is Delta Drilling Co. v. Simmons, 161 Tex. 122, 338 S.W.2d 143
(1960). Delta does involve a multiclause deed, but the deed in this case used the fraction 1/4
throughout. The controversy arose due to the reservation by the grantor of "the lease interest
and all future rentals." Id. at 125, 338 S.W.2d at 145. The court relied on Garrett v. Dils Co.,
157 Tex. 92, 93, 299 S.W.2d 904, 905 (1957), and held that the term "lease interest" referred to
the right to execute leases, or the executive right. Therefore, although the grantees received a
1/4 mineral interest, they did not have the right to lease that interest. Delta, 161 Tex. at 128,
338 S.W.2d at 146. Once again, the two-grant doctrine was not used. On the contrary, this
case refers to criticism of Tipps v. Bodine, 101 S.W.2d 1076 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1936,
writ ref'd), which is relied upon heavily in Jupiter Oil Co. v. Snow, 819 S.W.2d 466 (Tex.
1992), in applying the expansion facet of the two-grant doctrine. Delta, 161 Tex. at 128, 338
S.W.2d at 147 n.3.
Although the three cases cited by the court in Alford are totally inapposite to the twogrant doctrine, there are other cases that would have been more direct authority for the twogrant expansion facet. For example, in Schubert v. Miller, 119 S.W.2d 139, 141 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Texarkana 1938, no writ), the court of appeals reversed a judgment on an oil and gas
lease for failure to join necessary parties, on the premise that the interests in the deed would be
larger after the termination of an existing lease. The case of Etter v. Texaco, 371 S.W.2d 702,
704 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1963, writ ref'd n.r.e.) has been considered an expansion-facet
case, yet, its exegesis is representative of the faulty use of authorities that permeates most cases
confronted with construction of a multiclause deed. In Etter, the granting clause provided for
a 1/32 interest or 1/4 of 1/8 interest in the minerals; the subject-to clause covered 1/4 of all
the royalty; the future-lease clause provided that the grantor was entitled to all lease interests
and all future rentals. The parties had deleted, with a typewriter, another portion of the form
that allowed the parties to state the interests owned by the grantor and grantee in the minerals
and rents. Id. It was argued that the use of the double fraction and the deletion meant the
parties intended a conveyance of 1/4 of the royalty rather than 1/32 of the royalty or a 1/32
mineral interest. The court held that a 1/32 mineral interest was conveyed. Etter does not
appear to hold that any expansion of interest occurred. Although the facts are more akin to
those in Garrett v. Dils Co. than those in Delta Drilling Co. v. Simmons, the Etter court unconvicingly held that Delta controlled instead of Garrett. Id. at 705. As in Richardson v. Hart,
185 S.W.2d 563 (Tex. 1945), the court refused to accord any significance to the use of double
fractions. Etter, 371 S.W.2d at 706. Similarly, rather than use a four corners approach and
consider the effect of the express deletion, the court refused to consider it at all. Id. The Etter
court completes its ad hoc analysis by quoting a law review article out of context. Id. (quoting
but misapplying Joseph W. Morris, Mineral Interest or Royalty Interests?, 29 SW. LEGAL
FOUND. 259, 269). The court cited the Morris article for the proposition that language in the
future lease clause is unreliable. See Etter, 371 S.W.2d at 706. The article, however, does not
make that suggestion. Instead, it stresses that the subject-to and future lease clauses are unnecessary, because the grantee is "entitled to share in bonuses, rentals and royalties in the same
identical proportion as his mineral ownership bears to the entire mineral estate." See Morris,
supra, at 269. The author then cites Hoffman v. Magnolia Petroleum in support of the proposition that these clauses have been construed in a manner that frustrates intent. Id.
129. Alford, 653 S.W.2d at 466.
130.
131.

Id. at 465-66.
Woods v. Sims, 154 Tex. 59, 273 S.W.2d 617 (1954).
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tion of Garrett is in support of the greatest estate possible rule.' 32 As in
the dissent, the court did not consider the use of double fractions to show
133
intent or to suggest an ambiguity.
The expansion facet was also advocated as the proper construction
method by the dissent when Alford reached the supreme court. In support of that position, Chief Justice Pope viewed Garrett v. Dils Co. as
applying the expansion facet of the two-grant doctrine, while most commentators have viewed it as rejecting that doctrine. 134 An analysis of
Garrett,however, reveals that the court was interpreting the deed under
the four corners doctrine rather than the two-grant doctrine.
3.

Garrett v. Dils Company-Rejection of the Two-Grant Doctrine

Garrettinvolved the construction of a three-grant deed. The granting clause conveyed to the grantee "an undivided one sixty-fourth interest in and to all of the oil, gas and other minerals."' 3 5 The subject-to
clause provided that the conveyance "includes one-eighth of all of the oil
royalty"' 3 6 due under the existing lease. The future-lease clause provided that:
It is understood and agreed that one-eighth of the money rentals which may be paid to extend the term within which a well may
be begun under the terms of said lease is to be paid to the said
Grantee and in event that the above described lease for any reason
becomes cancelled or forfeited, then and in that event an undivided
one-eighth of the lease interest and all future rentals on said land
for oil, gas and other mineral privileges shall be owned by said
Grantee, he owning one-eighth of one-eighth of all oil, gas, and
other minerals in and under37 said lands, together with one-eighth
interest in all future rents.'
The initial lease terminated and another was executed which provided for a one-eighth royalty. The controversy was whether the successor to the grantee was entitled to 1/8 or 1/64 of the 1/8 royalty. 138 The
court noted that the granting clause purported to convey a 1/64 mineral
132. Richardson v. Hart, 143 Tex. 392, 185 S.W.2d 563 (1945).
133. Id. at 467 (Young, J., dissenting) ("Use of a double fraction in a deed is not ambiguous; the reader may calculate the interest very simply.").
134. Compare Alford, 671 S.W.2d at 876 (Tex. 1984) (Pope, C.J., dissenting) with authorities cited supra note 66. Chief Justice Pope viewed Garrett as holding "that the intent of the
grantor was to convey a royalty of 1/64 or one-eighth of the one-eighth royalty ....
[T]he
Garrettcourt held that a different and a greater interest was conveyed upon the reverter of the
outstanding lease." Alford, 671 S.W.2d at 876.
135. Garrett v. Dils Co., 157 Tex. 92, 93, 299 S.W.2d 904, 905 (1957).
136. Id.
137. Id. at 93-94, 299 S.W.2d at 905.
138. Id. at 94, 299 S.W.2d at 905.
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interest. It chose not to view that fraction alone as representing intent,
however:
Had other language in the deed not disclosed what the parties understood "one sixty-fourth" to mean, it would be our duty to give
those words their usual meaning and construe the deed as a mineral deed to an undivided one sixty-fourth of the minerals in place.
But there follows the granting clause language which clearly defines what the parties understood 'one sixty-fourth' of the minerals
to mean.
Construing this deed as a whole and giving effect to each and
every provision thereof, we are led to the conclusion that the royalty conveyed under future leases was the same as that conveyed
under the then existing lease,-that is to say, one-eighth thereof.
We further conclude that having the right to receive one-eighth of
the royalty, together with a one-eighth lease interest and future
rentals thereon, the respondent
in reality is the owner of one-eighth
139
of the minerals in the land.
Since the controversy in Garrett concerned the royalty payable
under a new lease, rather than the size and type of interest conveyed,
some of the language in the opinion is prone to a two-grant spin. Yet,
unlike the Alford opinions, the court in Garrettdid not take the fraction
in the granting clause at face value but interpreted it in light of several
facts. It considered that the subject-to clause used the fraction 1/8, the
future-lease clause used a double fraction, 1/8 of 1/8, and the usual royalty provided in a mineral lease is 1/8.40 In concluding that the deed
conveyed an undivided 1/8 of the minerals, the court also noted that the
deed gave all the rights incident to ownership of 1/8 of the minerals to
the grantee. 141
139. Id. at 95-97, 299 S.W.2d at 906-07.
140. Id. at 96, 299 S.W.2d at 906-07.
141. Id. at 96, 299 S.W.2d at 907. In a post-Aliford appellate case, Hawkins v. Texas Oil
and Gas Corp., 724 S.W.2d 878, 886 (Tex. App.-Waco 1987, writ ref'd n.r.e.), the court
determined that the Hoffman facet should have survived the overruling of that case, but not
the expansion facet where a clause irreconcilably conflicts with the granting clause. The court
noted that Garrett had mistakenly been labeled a two-grant doctrine case and then considered
the application of that case. Id. at 884. It held that even if the Garrett approach survived
Alford, Garrett could be distinguished because in the deed at issue the grantee did not receive
all of the attributes of ownership of the mineral estate, as in Garrett. Id. at 888. This holding
represents too narrow a reading of Garrett and should be rejected in light of Luckel. The
Texas Supreme Court has clearly held that a deed need not convey all attributes of the mineral
estate to a grantee in order to interpret it as a mineral, rather than a royalty conveyance. In
Altman v. Blake, 712 S.W.2d 117 (Tex. 1986), the court construed the deed as conveying a
mineral interest even though the grantee did not receive the executive right or the right to
share in bonus and rentals. Id. at 120. The Hawkins court confused two separate construction
issues: First, how to determine the size of the interest when a deed contains conflicting fractions in a multiclause deed; and second, how to determine whether a mineral or royalty inter-
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The consideration of these facts to explain the use of the fraction
1/64 as meaning a 1/8 mineral interest demonstrates that the two-grant
doctrine, as it was applied in the Alford opinions, was not used. The
Garrett holding was not that there was an expansion of interest or that
separate conveyances were made. Instead, the Garrett court's approach
rejected the Hoffman-Hart view of a multiclause deed as making separate
conveyances. Another distinctive aspect of the Garrett approach is that
it recognizes the role of double fractions in determining intent. 142
The Garrettcourt's approach also implicitly accorded significance to
the estate misconception. This is evident in its considering the use of
double fractions and taking judicial notice of the fact that the usual royalty is 1/8. If the grantor desired to convey 1/8 of the entire mineral
estate, and he mistakenly considered that he only owned 1/8 of the minerals due to an existing lease entitling him to a 1/8 royalty, then he
would use the fraction 1/64, or the double fraction 1/8 of 1/8.
In summary, the Garrett court's approach can be characterized as
explicitly adopting a four corners approach with implicit consideration of
the estate misconception, and as rejecting the view that a multiclause
deed is used to make separate conveyances. In contrast, in the Alford
decisions the expansion facet of the two-grant doctrine was applied and
each clause of the deed was viewed in a vacuum. There was no attempt
to harmonize the conflicting fractions in light of other language in the
deed or to consider why conflicting and double fractions were used. Instead, it appears both the majority in the appellate decision and the dissent in the Texas Supreme Court decision adopted the distorting view of
Hoffman, Hart,Benge, and Woods that the use of the multiclause deed
evinces intent to make separate conveyances.
The majority opinion in Alford adopted an equally egregious position by focusing only on the fraction used in the granting clause. Luckel
should be viewed as eradicating both of these approaches by reinstating
ascertainment of the intent of the parties as the primary postulate in deed
construction.

IV.
A.

THE LUCKEL AND JUPITER DECISIONS

Luckel v. White

In Luckel v. White, the Texas Supreme Court faced the problem of
construing a multiclause deed for the first time since its decision in A lford
est was conveyed. Altman provides guidelines on the latter issue but does not involve
conflicting fractions. To resolve that issue, this author suggests that Luckel should be viewed
as a reaffirmation of the Garrett v. Dils Co. approach.
142. Garrett, 157 Tex. at 95, 299 S.W.2d at 906.
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v. Krum. As in Alford, the granting clause and the future-lease clause
used different fractions, and the parties did not assert that the deed was
ambiguous.' 43 In Luckel, the granting clause provided that the grantor
conveyed to Luckel "an undivided one thirty-second (1/32nd) royalty
interest." The habendum and warranty clause followed and referred to
the above described 1/32 royalty interest. The subject-to clause provided
that the grantee "shall receive one-fourth of any and all royalties paid
under the terms of said lease." The future-lease clause stated that it is
"expressly understood and agreed" that the grantee "shall be entitled to
one-fourth of any and all royalties" under future leases.'"
The existing lease terminated, and the property was subject to other
leases providing for a 1/6 royalty. The grantee's successors claimed they
were entitled to 1/4 of all of the royalties under these leases, or 1/24.
The grantor's successor argued that the deed entitled them only to a fixed
145
1/32 royalty.
The appellate court applied Alford.' 6 The supreme court held that
Alford could dictate even though it involved a mineral interest, and a
royalty interest was clearly conveyed to Luckel.' 47 Rather than apply
the repugnant-to-the-grant rule, the court held that "the majority in Alford incorrectly failed to harmonize the provisions under the four comers
rule."' 4 8 The Luckel court ruled that the deed could be "properly harmonized to mean that the interest conveyed was one-fourth of the royalties reserved under the existing and all future leases."' 49 The use of the
fraction 1/32 in the warranty clause was harmonized by holding that the
grantee was to "receive not less than 1/32nd of production, which is one143.

Luckel v. White, 819 S.W.2d 459, 461 (Tex. 1991).

144. Id. Additionally, in a final clause, the grant explained that since the grantor only
owned one-half of the royalties under the terms of the present existing lease, and the other onehalf had been conveyed by her to her children, grantor "conveyed one-half of the one-sixteenth
(1/16th) royalty now reserved by her." Id. The court does not discuss this language in its
analysis.
145.
146.

Id.
Luckel v. White, 792 S.W.2d 485, 490 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1990), rev'd,

819 S.W.2d 459 (Tex. 1991). The supreme court also rejected the alternative holding adopted
by the appellate court that required harmonizing the deed to hold that a fixed 1/32 royalty was
conveyed. The supreme court determined that this was improper because it alters the clear
language of the future-lease clause to convey a 1/4 royalty. Luckel, 819 S.W.2d at 464.
147. Luckel, 819 S.W.2d at 464. The deed did not have conflicting references to royalty
and mineral interests. The interest was consistently referred to as a royalty interest and the
grantee did not receive any of the attributes of the mineral estate. Therefore, the court was not
presented with the additional problem of determining whether a royalty or mineral interest
was conveyed. See discussion of Hawkins, supra note 141.
148. Luckel, 819 S.W.2d at 464.
149. Id. at 465.
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fourth of the usual one-eighth." 5 °
Since the court held that the deed conveyed the same fractional royalty interest under existing and future leases, it appears that the expansion facet was not used. The first facet of the two-grant doctrine is
inapposite, since the question in Luckel was not whether the deed created
separate grants of mineral and royalty interests. 5 ' However, the court
did use language consistent with the view that the deed created separate
grants under the granting clause and the future lease clause. Most notably, it held that the language in the future lease clause is as effective to
grant an interest as the language of the granting clause. 52 It also cited
Richardson v. Hart and Woods v. Sims, two of the supreme court cases
that used the Hoffman facet of the two-grant doctrine.1 53 Yet, the court
also held that its method of harmonizing is consistent with the approach
used in Garrett v. Dils Co. 154
Determining which rule or rules of construction the supreme court
intends to use to supplant Alford requires harmonizing its simultaneous
reliance on the Hoffman-Hart line of cases and Garrett. The most probable explanation is that the court still clings to the distorted view of the
multiclause deed as making separate grants. Another explanation is that
another version of the two-grant doctrine was formulated. Since the
court held that the same interest was conveyed under existing and future
leases despite the use of different fractions, this version of the two-grant
doctrine (if it exists) is different than the expansion facet used in Jupiter
Oil and urged in the Alford decisions. It also differs from the application
of the two-grant doctrine in Richardson v. Hart.I55 In those opinions, no
attempt is made to harmonize the fractions used in light of other language in the deed or the fact that the usual royalty has been assumed to
be 1/8. Instead, the court accepted the fractions in each clause as
written.
150. Id.
151. See Luckel v. White, 792 S.W.2d 485, 491 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1990),
rev'd, 819 S.W.2d 459 (Tex. 1991) (seeking to "foreclose any question of the applicability of the
'double grant theory'" of Hoffman).
152. Luckel, 819 S.W.2d at 463. The court cited Sun Oil Co. v. Burns, 125 Tex. 549, 553,
84 S.W.2d 442, 444 (1935). That case is not authority for viewing a future-lease clause as
making a separate conveyance. It merely determined that a mother hubbard clause was sufficient to include additional acreage in a lease. Id.
As another example of the use of the two-grant doctrine, the supreme court in Luckel
determined that the future-lease clause "presently conveyed the possibility of reverter to onefourth fractional interest of the royalty interest." Luckel, 819 S.W.2d at 464. It also focused
on the interest conveyed after termination of the existing lease. Id.
153. Id. at 462-64.
154. Id. at 464.
155. 143 Tex. 392, 185 S.W.2d 563 (1945).
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Another possible explanation for the two-grant tendencies apparent
in the Luckel decision is that the question for decision was framed as
"what effect the one-fourth language of the future lease clause should
have" on the use of the four-corners rule and other traditional rules of
construction." 6 The answer given is that the fraction in the future lease
clause, as well as the assumption that the parties contemplated only the
usual one-eighth royalty, explain the use of a conflicting fraction in the
granting clause. When the holding in Luckel is posed in this manner, it
appears that the four comers rule and the Garrett approach as outlined in
Part II, and not the two-grant doctrine, have been designated as the successors to the repugnant-to-the-grant rule.
The concurring and dissenting opinions in Luckel also send mixed
signals as to whether the majority opinion should be viewed as adopting
any version of the two-grant doctrine. The concurring judge agreed that
A iford should be overruled and that the intent in the deed at issue was to
convey 1/4 of the royalties reserved under the existing and all future
leases.'" 7 This indicates that Justice Mauzy did not assume that the expansion facet was or should be used. He was compelled, however, to
suggest that Chief Justice Pope's dissenting opinion in Alford should be
expressly adopted. 1 8 As demonstrated in Part II, Pope viewed Garrett
as using the expansion facet. In describing Pope's opinion, however, the
concurring judge explained that Pope rejected arbitrary rules and urged
determining intent from a consideration of all parts of the instrument. 159
Thus, the concurring opinion seems to extoll the virtues of the four corners rule rather than the two-grant doctrine.
The dissent clearly views the majority as using the two-grant doctrine. In chastising the court for doing so, the dissenting opinion includes the following quote from a well-respected oil and gas treatise:
"The oft-repeated expression that a grantor has the power to convey by
one instrument different interests in the possibility of reverter and under
the subsisting lease should not obscure the fact that very few grantors
really intend to convey interests of different magnitude."" 6 Although
that advice should be heeded, the majority in Luckel did not hold that
interests of different magnitude were conveyed. On the contrary, the
court held that the same interest was conveyed under existing and future
leases. The dissent would discard the distorting view of the multiclause
deed as making separate conveyances. However, it would apply the frac156.
157.
158.
159.
160.

Luckel, 819 S.W.2d at 462.
Id. at 465 (Mauzy, J., concurring).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 466 (Phillips, C.J., dissenting).
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tion in the granting clause, 1/32, and explain the use of the fraction 1/4
in the future lease clause by assuming the parties "carelessly referred to
the interest under future leases as one-fourth of all royalties rather than
one fourth of a 1/8th royalty."16 1 The more likely explanation is not that
the grantors were careless in the future lease clause, but that they assumed the fraction 1/32 was the proper way to convey a 1/4 royalty in
the granting clause since the land was under a lease providing for a 1/8
62
royalty. 1
B.

Jupiter Oil Company v. Snow

While the Luckel opinion sends mixed signals about the approach it
adopts, the majority opinion in Jupiter Oil clearly applies the expansion
facet of the two-grant doctrine. The granting clause in the 1918 deed in
Jupiter Oil conveyed an "undivided 1/16 interest in and to all the oil, gas,
and other minerals." 163 The deed acknowledged that the tract was under
a lease and in the third paragraph provided that the grantee was to have
an undivided 1/2 interest in the event the lease terminated." 6
As in Luckel, the issue in Jupiter Oil was framed specifically as,
what is the interest conferred in the deed after the end of the existing
lease? 165 The court began its opinion by holding that Alford v. Krum is
inapplicable since this deed "unambiguously grants a one-sixteenth interest in the mineral estate as well as seven-sixteenths of the grantor's possibility of reverter."' 166 The opinion concludes by holding that, "[t]he
effect of this grant is that when the [existing] lease ended, Jupiter's interest in the mineral estate simultaneously expanded into a full one-half by
167
operation of law."
The analysis in Jupiter Oil is troublesome for several reasons. First,
161. Id. at 465. The dissent assumes that it would be natural to use a double fraction to
express intent to convey a 1/32 interest.
162. Id. at 466. The dissenting judge also saw no reason to overrule Alford since "no party
has urged, nor does the court find, a conflict between the granting clause and any other clause
of the deed." Id. Other than the fact that Alford involved a conveyance of a mineral interest
and Luckel involved a royalty, it is difficult to distinguish between the two. Both cases involved the use of a smaller fraction in the granting clause than in the future-lease clause. Id. at
460.
163. Jupiter Oil Co. v. Snow, 819 S.W.2d 466, 468 (Tex. 1991). Unlike the deed in Luckel,
this deed involved the conveyance of a mineral interest. Id. at 467. It also predates the Caruthers decision. However, given the unsettled nature of oil and gas jurisprudence at that early
date it seems certain that the estate misconception explains the conflicting fractions. See supra
part II.
164. Jupiter Oil Co., 819 S.W.2d at 468.
165. Id. at 467.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 469.
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as the concurring judge notes, it is difficult to distinguish between the
facts of this case and the facts of Alford.16 Second, the court adopted
169
the reasoning of a 1936 Texas appellate court case, Tipps v. Bodine,
which committed the estate misconception. That case involved a postCaruthers multiclause deed that used the fraction 1/16 in the granting
170
clause and the fraction 1/2 in the subject-to and future-lease clauses.
The court described the effect of the lease as giving the lessee a determinable fee in 7/8 of the minerals, with the grantor retaining 1/8.171 As
explained in Part II, the estates created by an oil and gas lease are a
determinable fee in 8/8 of the mineral estate in the lessee, leaving the
lessor with a possibility of reverter in 8/8. The provision for payment of
royalty is the economic translation of the mineral estate owner's appurtenant right in the mineral estate.
Since the Tipps court believed, due to the estate misconception, that
the grantor owned 1/8 of the minerals after the lease, it assumed the
fraction 1/16 was the proper way to express intent to convey 1/2 of all
the grantor owned at the time. The court, therefore, affirmed the trial
court's ruling that had permitted reformation by replacing the fraction
1/16 with 1/2.172 In Jupiter, however, the court adopts Tipps' descriptions of the estates, but then fails to assess, or harmonize, the use of the
fraction 1/16. Therefore, the decision will propagate, rather than eradicate, the estate misconception.
The Jupiter decision is also troubling because the holding comports
with the expansion facet of the two-grant doctrine, but it does not cite
any of the two-grant cases or urge the adoption of the A/ford dissent or
appellate opinion. The opinion also fails to mention Garrett v. Dils Co.
It is perplexing that it cites Caruthersv. Leonard without noting that it
has been overruled or assessing its unfortunate effect on mineral and royalty conveyances.
The Jupiter decision cannot be reconciled with the holding in
Luckel. The Luckel opinion expressly approves the Garrett opinion and
the Jupiter opinion fails to mention it. In Luckel, the court harmonized
the conflicting fractions and held that the same quantum of interest was
168. Id. (Hecht, J., concurring) ("If Alford and this case are not twins, there is certainly a
strong resemblance between them.").
169. 101 S.W.2d 1076, 1076 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1936, writ ref'd).
170. Id. The date of the deed was 1930. Id. The future lease clause also provided that the
grantee would own "1/16 of all oil, gas and other minerals in and under said lands, together

with 1/2 interest in all future events." Id. at 1078.
171. Id.
172. Id. See also Thomas H. Lee, Ambiguity and the "Subject To" Clause In Texas Mineral Conveyancing, 5 S. TEX. L.J. 313, 319 (1961) (discussing court's analysis in permitting

reformation).
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conveyed under existing and future leases, while in Jupiter the court applied the expansion facet of the two-grant doctrine. If the Jupiteropinion
had used the Luckel-Garrett approach, the holding would have been that
a 1/2 mineral interest was conveyed under existing and future leases.
This would not change the ultimate result since the original lease had
terminated, but it would clarify the state of the law. It would also eradicate the estate misconception and the Hoffman-Hart view of multiclause
deeds. Instead, the current state of the law for construing mineral or
royalty deeds with conflicting fractions is unclear. To provide clarity,
the Jupiter decision should be discounted due to its faulty exegesis, and
Luckel should be viewed as a reaffirmation of the approach in Garrettv.
Dils Co.
V.

ADOPTION AND REFINING OF THE GARRETT APPROACH

A. Response to Criticisms of Garrett
The Garrett v. Dils Co. approach has been criticized as using reformation disguised as construction in violation of the parol evidence
rule. 173 The approach used in that case, however, does not purport to
discover actual subjective intent, which is the basis of reformation. Nor
is it relying on outside evidence to contradict the writing in violation of
the parol evidence rule. 174 Instead, it adopts an objective explanation of
intent based on the fractions used in the four corners of the document.
This should be permissible under the liberal, harmonizing approach reaffirmed in Luckel. The court's explicit consideration of the usual 1/8 royalty and its implicit consideration of the estate misconception are also
permissible under the general principle that meaning can be determined,
173. See HEMINGWAY, supra note 6, § 2.7, at 95 (remarking that Garrett is an example of
courts, "on behalf of befuddled litigants, benevolently and improperly granting reformation in
the guise of a judgment for title."). In another section of his treatise, Professor Hemingway
cites Garrett as support for the following statement: "Although courts usually follow the
[rules for admission of parol evidence], instances may be found where relief in the form of
reformation, modification, etc., has been given in suits for the purpose of determining title."
Id. § 3.2, at 121. But see, Lee, supra note 172, at 326, (stating that the court in Garrett "does
not add to the erroneous notion that after a lease the lessee owns 7/8 of the minerals and the
lessor 1/8 but, [sic] it simply takes into consideration that some people think so, a laudable and
practical approach to the problem.").
174. "Evidence offered strictly for the purpose of aiding in the construction of a written
instrument is not within the prohibition of the Parol Evidence Rule." MCCORMICK & RAY,
supra note 27, § 1681 at 399-400. That rule is invoked to prevent contradiction or additions
once meaning has been established. See generally, Edwin W. Patterson, The Interpretationand
Construction of Contracts, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 833 (1964) (discussing general interpretation
doctrines); Note, The Interpretationof Mineral and Royalty Deeds-The Manipulation of the
Parol Evidence Rule, 38 MINN. L. REV. 857 (1954) (applying parol evidence rule to mineral
and royalty deeds).
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as a matter of law, in light of the circumstances existing at the time the
document was drafted. 17 Given the imprecise nature of the litany of
rules courts recite for determining ambiguity and the use of extrinsic evidence, it is counterproductive to reject the Garrett approach as violative
of those rules. Instead, Luckel's reaffirmation of the Garrett approach
should be welcomed as another instance in which Texas courts have
adopted specific rules for particular constructional problems to enhance
title stability.
B.

The Garrett Approach Refined: Adoption of Specific Rules

In order to further promote title certainty without sacrificing intent,
the court should define the contours of the Garrett approach. This can
be done by extracting guidelines from Garrett's analysis of the use of
double fractions, which includes taking judicial notice of the fact that the
usual royalty has been 1/8, its explicit rejection of the Hoffman-Hart
view of the multiclause deed, and its implicit consideration of the estate
misconception. These guidelines should include the following: 1) if the
fraction in the future-lease clause times 1/8 equals the fraction in the
granting clause, the fraction in the future lease clause expresses intent
regarding the quantum of the present, as well as future, conveyance; 2)
175. See supra part I for rules of construction. To subvert any allegations of disguised
reformation or parol evidence violations, the court could take judicial notice of the estate misconception as it has the usual 1/8 royalty in mineral leases. This should not be necessary,
however, since it is within the purview of the court to formulate rules of construction unless
they clearly conflict with settled principles. Courts have taken judicial notice of the fact that
the usual royalty in an oil and gas lease is 1/8. See, e.g., Garrett v. Dils Co., 157 Tex. 92, 96,
299 S.W.2d 904-07 (1957); Badger v. King, 331 S.W.2d 955, 957 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso
1960, writ ref'd n.r.e.). See also Harrell v. Nash, 133 P.2d 748 (Okla. 1942). But see White v.
White, 830 S.W.2d 767, 770 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, no writ) (court refused to
take judicial notice that usual royalty is 1/8).
Rule 201(b) of the Texas Rules of Civil Evidence provides that a judicially noticed fact
must be one not subject to reasonable dispute in that it is either: (1) generally known within
the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court or (2) capable of accurate and ready determination
by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned. TEX. R. EVID, 201(b).
See also Olin Guy Wellborn III, Judicial Notice Under Article II of the Texas Rules of Evidence, 19 ST. MARY'S L.J. 2, 13 (1987). See generally E. F. Roberts, JudicialNotice: An Essay
Concerning Human Misunderstanding, 61 WASH. L. REV. 1435, 1437 (1986); C. William
Kraft, Comment, The Presently Expanding Concept of Judicial Notice, 13 VILL. L. REV. 530,
532, 552 (1968). See also Parten v. Cannon, 829 S.W.2d 327 (Tex. App.-Waco 1992, no
writ). In Parten, the court was interpreting an oil and gas lease to determine if a filing requirement created a condition, which would cause automatic forfeiture if violated, or a covenant,
which would not cause the entire lease to terminate. The court relied on the rule that if the
surrounding circumstances suggest the contract is capable of only a single meaning, the court
can confine itself to the writing. Id. at 330. The court determined that the surrounding circumstances, a letter, evinced no intent for a total forfeiture of the lease on portions maintained
by production beyond the primary term. Id. at 331.

1993]

Two-GRANT DOCTRINE

the use of double fractions should be considered in the interpretation process, for example, if a double fraction is used to convey a mineral interest,
which consists of 1/8 accompanied by another fraction, the accompanying fraction is the intended quantum of the mineral estate to be conveyed;17 6 3) in light of the history behind the three-grant deed, a
document should not be construed as making two grants due to the use
of that form, unless additional evidence of intent is found; and 4) if the
document cannot be harmonized under the first two rules, it should1 77be
considered ambiguous and extrinsic evidence should be considered.
Title certainty has been a consistent goal for the Texas Supreme
Court in formulating rules of construction. 78 The application of the
Garrett approach and the foregoing recommended rules would promote
this goal by permitting a determination of the estates created from the
four corners of most multiclause deeds with conflicting fractions. A title
examiner, then, could confidently determine ownership interests without
litigation.
C. The Garrett Approach Compared to Other Possible Rules for
Construing Multiclause Deeds with Conflicting Fractions
1.

The Two-Grant Doctrine

The two-grant doctrine does have a positive aspect: it is easy to
apply, since fractions are taken at face value, which would aid title certainty. The goal of title certainty, however, should not be achieved at the
176. See discussion of double fractions in Richardson v. Hart, 143 Tex. 392, 185 S.W.2d
563 (1945). This consideration of double fractions would change the result in a number of
cases that have not attempted to ascertain the intent behind using double fractions from the
four corners of the document. For example, in Harriss v. Ritter, 154 Tex. 474, 478, 279
S.W.2d 845, 847 (1955), an instrument reserved 1/2 of 1/8 of the oil, gas and other mineral
royalty and 1/2 of bonus and rentals. The court held that a 1/16 "of" royalty together with
1/2 of bonus and rentals was reserved. Under the Garrett approach and proposed rules, the
document would be interpreted to convey a 1/2 mineral interest, since the use of the double
fraction can be explained by taking note of the usual royalty and the estate misconception.
The rules should be used to determine if a mineral or royalty interest is being conveyed.
See supra text accompanying notes 25-56.
177. See e.g., Stag Sales Co. v. Flores, 697 S.W.2d 493, 495 (Tex. App.-San Antonio
1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.). When a drafter is functioning under the estate misconception, the
fraction in the granting clause is smaller. See supra part II. This case is unusual in that the
fraction in the future lease clause is smaller than the fraction in the granting clause. Therefore,
the rules outlined above would not be applicable, and it would be appropriate to consider the
conflicting fractions as creating an ambiguity that should be resolved through the use of extrinsic evidence.
178. See Altman v. Blake, 712 S.W.2d 117, 120 (Tex. 1986) ("We recognize the necessity
for stability and certainty in the construction of mineral conveyances."); Moser v. United
States Steel Corp., 676 S.W.2d 99, 101 (Tex. 1984) (severance of mineral estate from surface
estate).
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expense of the parties' intent. Dean Kuntz commented on the competing
goals of ascertaining intent and title stability:
Nevertheless, the controlling policy is that certainty, though desirable, should be sacrificed in favor of preserving property ownership; that it is not desirable to achieve certainty at the risk of
producing injustice to parties who through ignorance or neglect
inadvertently make a poor choice of words
in attempting to express
179
their intentions in a written instrument.
It is not disputed that parties may convey interests in different sizes at
different times. Given the history behind the advent of the three-grant
deed, compounded by the pervasiveness of the estate misconception, it is
unlikely that two grants were intended in conveyances using that deed
form. 80 Therefore, applying the two-grant doctrine frustrates the intent
of the parties. The Garrett approach is preferable because it provides a
more accurate assessment of intent without sacrificing title certainty.
2.

The Kansas Approach

In a 1984 Kansas Supreme Court case, the court took express notice
of the estate misconception in construing a deed with conflicting fractions. 81 The court determined that an ambiguity existed which permitted the use of extrinsic evidence.1 82 This approach is laudable because it
recognizes the explanation for conflicting fractions that insures an interpretation reflecting actual intent. The necessity of litigation that follows
the determination of ambiguity, however, would be detrimental to title
certainty.
179. EUGENE KUNTZ, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF OIL AND GAS § 16.1, at 474 (1987).
180. See e.g., Snow v. Jupiter Oil Co., 802 S.W.2d 354, 358 (Tex. App.-Eastland 1991),
rev'd 819 S.W.2d 466 (Tex. 1991) (evidence showed that parties had treated the deed as conveying 1/2 under the existing lease). The dissent in Luckel made this point and cited the
Williams & Meyers treatise as support. See Luckel v. White, 819 S.W.2d 459, 466 (Tex. 1991)
(Phillips, C.J., dissenting).
181. See Heyen v. Hartnett, 679 P.2d 1152, 1158 (Kan. 1984). The granting clause in
Heyen provided for a 1/16 mineral interest, but the subject-to clause read, "an undivided 1/2
interest in the Royalties, Rentals and Proceeds." Id. at 1154. The court quoted extensively
from an earlier supreme court case that carefully explained the estate misconception. Id. at
1158 (quoting Shepard v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 368 P.2d 19, 26 (Kan. 1962)). In
Shepard, the court's analysis was very similar to that used in Garrett because the court determined there was no ambiguity since the conflicting fractions could be explained in light of the
royalty reserved and the estate misconception. See Shepard, 368 P.2d at 26. See generally
KUNTZ, supra note 179, § 16.3, at 491.
182. Heyen, 679 P.2d at 1158. But see Shepard, 368 P.2d at 26, in which the court, with
analysis very similar to Garrett, determined that the conflicting fractions did not create an
ambiguity.

19931

3.

TwO-GRANT DOCTRINE

Preferringthe Subject-To or Future-Lease Clause

Since the three-grant deed was used largely in response to Caruthers,
it is likely that the subject-to clause or future-lease clause is an accurate
expression of the mineral or royalty interest intended to be conveyed
under existing and future leases.1 83 The estate misconception also does

not generally produce errors in those clauses. Preferring one of these
clauses, however, would be committing the same error as in Alford of
failing to determine intent from the entire document. Unlike an ap-

proach that prefers one clause over another, the Garrettapproach is congruous with the primary tenet of deed construction, the four corners rule.
4.

The Greatest-Estate-PossibleRule

The rule that a deed should be construed to pass the greatest-estatepossible is a venerable rule of construction that has been invoked in
countless cases, including Garrett v. Dils Co. 184 This rule would promote
title certainty, because the fraction that conveyed the largest estate would
prevail. It suffers from the same malady as Alford, however, because it
approves disregarding conflicting provisions in the deed, which is incongruous with the four corners rule.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The two-grant doctrine is the progeny of obscure cases and conceptual confusion. There is no basis in precedent or policy for its rebirth in
Texas deed construction.18 5 It is an arbitrary rule that tends to frustrate
rather than elucidate the parties' intent in direct contravention of the
consistent mandate that ascertaining intent is the primary goal of deed
construction.
Luckel should be viewed, in general, as a reaffirmation of the four
corners rule and a rejection of arbitrary rules, including the two-grant
doctrine. In construction of multiclause deeds, 8 6 Luckel should again
be viewed as rejecting the two-grant doctrine and as reaffirming the lib183. See Herd, supra note 4, at 647 n.77; Smith, supra note 52, § 15.02[2].
184. Garrett, 157 Tex. at 94, 299 S.W.2d at 906. See also Herd, supra note 4, at 662
(suggestsing using the greatest estate possible rule to solve the unique constructional problem
presented in Stag Sales Co. v. Flores, 697 S.W.2d 493, 494 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1985, writ
ref'd n.r.e.)). As noted in note 168 supra, that case is unusual because the fraction in the
future-lease clause was 1/16 while the fraction in the granting clause was 1/2.
185. This does not include the use of the grant and regrant fiction, which has been used
under the cy pres principle to avoid violations of the rule against perpetuities. See Bagby v.
Bredthauer, 627 S.W.2d 190, 195 (Tex. App.-Austin 1981, no writ).
186. This would require the rejection of the two-grant doctrine for holding that two different estates were conveyed, as in Hoffman, as well as that different sizes of interests were conveyed at different times, as in Jupiter, simply because a multiclause deed was used. A deed
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eral approach in Garrett v. Dils Co. that requires harmonizing conflicting
fractions from the four comers of the deed. To further promote title
stability, the Texas Supreme Court should be responsive to the unique
problems caused by the estate misconception and the history behind the
multiclause deed and adopt specific rules for guidance. The rules suggested in Part IV would refine the approach used in Garrett and reaffirmed in Luckel. The rules for deed construction in Texas are
sufficiently malleable to permit adoption of this approach against charges
that it confuses construction with reformation or violates the parol evidence rule. Moreover, unlike the two-grant doctrine, the harmonizing
approach will preserve the sanctity of the parties' intent.
After Luckel, it is clear the repugnant-to-the-grant doctrine is no
longer a definitive rule of deed construction in Texas. Whether the Garrett approach or the two-grant doctrine should be hailed as its successor,
however, is not clear. Luckel simultaneously approves of Garrett's harmonizing approach and other cases that used the Hoffman facet of the
two-grant doctrine. In Jupiter Oil the court inanely distinguishes Alford
and ignores Luckel's harmonizing approach. Instead, the court blatantly uses the expansion facet of the two-grant doctrine that requires
accepting conflicting fractions at face value. Therefore, the current state
of the law for construing multiclause deeds with conflicting fractions is
unclear. At the earliest opportunity, the Texas Supreme Court should
provide clarity by adopting the Garrett approach and specific rules for
harmonizing these deeds, and by expressly renouncing a rebirth of the
two-grant doctrine.

should not be construed as making two grants unless there is additional evidence of such
intent.

